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M.B.A., Wharton School of Business Administration, University of Pennsylvania, 1973;
Ph.D. Candidate, Administration & Organizational Management, University of
Pennsylvania, School of Education, 1973–78.
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MS. COWARD:# This panel will focus on the potential
conflicts of interest that arise when different sports interests are
represented by the same individual.
DEAN FEERICK: Thank you very much.
Why don’t I go to the panelists? Mr. Feher?
MR. FEHER: I would like to start out by talking just a little bit
about the basic labor structure and the roles that different actors in
all this play, because unless you have a basic sense of that, you
really cannot tell where the conflicts may or may not arise.
I will start with a simple question, which is: If any one of you
wanted to go out tomorrow and sign up with an NFL player or any
Major League Baseball player to become a sports agent, could you
do that?
The short answer is, unless you have been registered by the
union in that sport, the answer is no, because in each of the major
league sports in the United States there is a union that represents
all of the players in that sport.1
Now, you may say: Well, what difference does that make?
||
Partner, Proskauer Rose, LLP. Associate, Proskauer Rose, LLP, 1981–84 & 1985–
89. Law Clerk to Judge Judith S. Kaye, New York Court of Appeals, 1984–85.
President, New York State Bar Association [NYSBA], 2001–02. Member, NYSBA
Committee on Standards of Attorney Conduct, 1999–present. Chair, NYSBA Committee
on Professional Ethics, 1990–94. Hearing Panel Chair, Departmental Disciplinary
Committee, First Judicial Department, New York, 1996–99. Hearing Panel Chair,
Committee on Grievances, U.S. District Court, Southern District, New York, 1995–2001.
Special Prosecutor, First Department Disciplinary Committee, New York, 1991–93.
Adjunct Professor, Georgia Institute of Technology, 1990–93. Adjunct Professor of
Legal Ethics, Columbia University School of Law, 1990–93. B.A., State University of
New York at Stony Brook, 1978; J.D., New York University School of Law, 1981.
#
Nicole Coward, Co-Symposium Editor, Fordham Sports Law Forum, Fordham
University School of Law. B.A., University of Virginia, 1999; J.D. expected, Fordham
University School of Law, 2003.
1
For example, professional football players in the NFL are represented by the NFL
Players Association [NFLPA], professional hockey players in the National Hockey
League [NHL] are represented by the NHL Players Association [NHLPA], professional
basketball players in the National Basketball Association [NBA] are represented by the
National Basketball Players Association [NBPA], and professional baseball players in
Major League Baseball [MLB] are represented by the MLB Players Association
[MLBPA]. See http://www.nflpa.org/main/default.asp; http://www.nhlpa.com; http://
www.nbpa.com; http://bigleaguers.yahoo.com.
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Well, there is a fundamental point there, because once you
have a union in place, under federal labor law, the union, under the
National Labor Relations Act,2 has the exclusive authority to
bargain on behalf of all of those employees on all terms and
conditions of employment.3
If the unions wanted to, just like the United Auto Workers does
with respect to General Motors or Ford or Chrysler, they could sit
down with the National Basketball Association (NBA), the
National Football League (NFL) and the others, with each of their
respective unions, and not negotiate a system where players
bargain individually together with agents, but instead have a wage
scale where shortstops get, just hypothetically, $20,000, first
basemen get $30,000, et cetera, et cetera.4 And I have to admit
that the owners in the various sports have tried to have that done
because it is a lot easier and simpler, given the marketplace for
professional athletes, to have a situation where there is no
competition for these players who are very sought after.5
But the unions in each of these sports have decided that they do
not want to do that. In the exercise of their authority under federal
labor law, they delegate a portion of their bargaining authority to
2

National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2000) [hereinafter NLRA].
Id. § 159(a) (providing that representatives selected to bargain for employees in a
collective bargaining unit “shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in
such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining”).
4
See United Auto Workers [UAW], About UAW: Who We Are, at
http://www.uaw.org/about/uawmembership.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2003)
(demonstrating that the UAW is one of the largest and most diverse unions in North
America); UAW, About UAW: Departments, at http://www.uaw.org/about/barg.html#gm
(last vited Mar. 25, 2003) (providing examples of the wage-scale concept, as utilized in
the UAW-GM National Agreement, the UAW-Saturn 1999 Agreement and the UAWDaimlerChrysler 1999 Agreement).
5
See, e.g., Fraser v. Major League Soccer, 284 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that
the teams comprising Major League Soccer [MLS] do not violate antitrust laws in
functioning as a single entity when negotiating employment contracts with players,
thereby preventing players from negotiating contracts with individual teams, restricting
player mobility, and facilitating a hard salary cap, which players claim prevents them
from attaining market value for their services), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 118 (2002);
Robert Wagman, MLS, Players Are No Closer to Settlement; Trial Set for September 18,
Soccer Times, at http://www.soccertimes.com/wagman/2000/feb24.htm (Feb. 24, 2000)
(explaining the history of the antitrust dispute between MLS and professional soccer
players in the league).
3
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the players with the agents who represent the players, or the
players individually if the players decide they want to represent
themselves.6
You may ask, why? Part of it is a basic function of economics,
because if you are a coal miner or an auto worker, it is generally
easy for your employer to find a replacement for you if you say
that you are going to leave the job unless your wages are
increased.7 That is why unions in the various industrial areas
sought the right to unionize for so long, so that there would not be
individual bargaining.8 If you look back in history, in the 1920s
and 1930s, before the Wagner Act9 came into place, all of the

6

As the bargaining representative for a group of professional ballplayers, players’
unions have the exclusive right to bargain with the relevant league on players’ behalf. 29
U.S.C. § 159(a). Players’ unions allow individual athletes to bargain with team owners
through the use of agents, as this system enables players to seek the greatest available
compensation for their unique skills and services. In order to, among other things,
promote quality among the players’ individual representatives, the unions demand that
players use only certified agents who are properly qualified to engage in contract
negotiation. See, e.g., NBA-NBPA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. XXXVI
(“The NBA shall not approve any Player Contract between a player and a Team unless
such player . . . is represented in the negotiations . . . by an agent or representative duly
certified by the Players Association in accordance with the Players Association’s Agent
Regulation Program.”), http://www.nbpa.com/cba/articleXXXVI.html; NFLPA, Agent
Regulations, at http://www.nflpa.org/agents/ main.asp?subPage=Agent+Regulations (last
visited Mar. 25, 2003) (explaining that agents must be certified by the NFLPA in order to
represent NFL athletes); NHLPA, Labour & Licensing, at http://www.nhlpa.com/
Content/ABOUT_THE_NHLPA/Labour_And_ Licensing.asp (last visited Mar. 25, 2003)
(explaining that agents must be certified by the NHLPA in order to represent NHL
athletes); MBLPA, Frequently Asked Questions, at http://bigleaguers.yahoo.com/mlbpa/
faq (last visited Mar. 25, 2003) (explaining that agents seeking to represent professional
baseball players must have at least one client on a MLB team’s forty man roster and
apply to the MLBPA for certification).
7
See generally UAW, United Auto Workers Local 2166: The History of Organized
Labor, at http://www.uaw2166.org/labor.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2003) (describing the
history of the organized labor movement).
8
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158–59 (providing that an employer may not “refuse to bargain
collectively with the representatives of his employees” and that these representatives
“shall be the exclusive representatives of such employees . . . for the purposes of
collective bargaining”).
9
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169. See also ABA, THE FIRST
SIXTY YEARS: THE STORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, 1935–1995, at 10
(1995), http://www.nlrb.gov/publications/first60yrs/60yrs.html.
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major industries did not want the unions, they wanted to
individually negotiate.10
In sports it is almost a complete mirror image, because the
economics of sports are such that the individual employees have
such unique individual talents, and the structure of the league is
such where you have different people competing for those athletes,
so it is more advantageous to have competition for the services of
the individual players.11
And so the unions representing all those players say, it is better
for us not to negotiate a wage scale but to have the different
owners competing for the individual players.12
And so when you look at agents, what does that mean in terms
of what they do and how they function?
The bottom line is that if the National Football League Players
Association (NFLPA) decided, even with sports agents, that with
individual bargaining it wanted to have a hundred, ten, a thousand
or even one agent representing all these players, the NFLPA could
do that.13 There is a series of court cases, including one involving
the National Basketball Players Association, the Collins14 case,
where an agent challenged the whole system of agent regulation
that was in place, where the agent got suspended. It went to
federal court and on appeal to the Tenth Circuit; the federal court
10
See ABA, supra note 9, at 9–20 (describing the history of the NLRA); UAW, supra
note 7 (describing the history of the organized labor movement).
11
See generally Wagman, supra note 5 (explaining the dispute between MLS and
professional soccer players in the league over whether each team should have to negotiate
as an individual entity with individual players for services; the players are of the opinion
that only such a structure will allow them to attain full market value for their services).
12
Teams in the NFL, NHL, NBA, and MLB do compete against one another for
players’ services. These players’ respective unions have determined that the players can
best attain market value for their services via individual negotiations. Hence, the unions
have guidelines permitting individual players to negotiate on their own behalf or through
the use of agents. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
13
Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 159(a), which provides that representatives selected to
bargain for employees in a collective bargaining unit “shall be the exclusive
representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective
bargaining,” a certified union has exclusive control over the manner in which employees
are represented.
14
Collins v. Nat’l Basketball Players Ass’n, No. 92-CV-1022, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS
24069 (10th Cir. Sept. 21, 1992).
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said: No, you can’t challenge this under the antitrust laws because,
as a matter of federal labor law, the decision as to what to do in
terms of delegating this authority is completely up to the union.15
As a result, there are extensive agent regulation programs in
each of the sports.16 So, for example, in the NFL, if you want to
represent an agent, not only do you have to pay a fairly substantial
fee at the outset to fund the agent program, but you also have to
take and pass a test.17 If you do not take and pass the test, you
cannot serve as an agent.18
One of the reasons the union does that in the NFL is because
the NFL salary cap is incredibly complicated.19 If the NFLPA
allowed agents who had no knowledge at all as to what the system
was about to represent players, the agents could do an awful lot of
harm.20
It is difficult to police the agents when you have as many
agents as you do. I am not going to say that any system is perfect,
but at the same time, the NFLPA has done periodic examinations
of the agents to try to ensure that the agents know what they are
doing, so that the players are not hurt.21
Within a very, very large area, the union has discretion to pick
and choose who they want to represent the players and the qualities

15

Id.
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
17
NFLPA, Agent Amendments: 2002 Agent Regulation Amendments, at
http://www.nflpa.org/agents/main.asp?subPage=Agent+Amendments (last visited Mar.
16, 2003). See also NFLPA, supra note 6.
18
NFLPA, supra note 17. See also NFLPA, supra note 6.
19
See NFL-NFLPA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT [CBA] art. XXIV–XXV
(1998),
http://www.nflpa.org/members/main.asp?subPage=CBA+Complete.
See
generally PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS & THE LAW 314–21 (2d ed.
1998) (discussing the evolution of the NFL salary cap, which the NFL players agreed to
in 1993, and explaining the economic trade-offs that take place in order to accommodate
the owners desire for a salary ceiling and the players unions’ desire to promote
competition for player services and to establish a salary floor).
20
See NFLPA, supra note 6 (stating that to ensure that agents have sufficient
understanding of the league’s financial structure, all agents are required to “[a]ttend an
NFLPA seminar on individual contract negotiations each year.”); NFLPA, supra note 17.
21
NFLPA, supra note 17.
16
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of those folks.22 These are not just things that are in the legal
books that do not make a difference day to day.
On Monday I am going to be in Los Angeles with one of my
colleagues, Jeff Kessler,23 who is almost always involved in these
things with me, as some of the folks on the podium and in the
audience know. There is going to be an oral argument in a case
involving a dispute between Leigh Steinberg and David Dunn.24
This has been very much in the papers.25
Leigh was considered for many years, and I do not want to say
he is not equally considered today, because these things are always
subjective, but for the longest while, Leigh was considered the
preeminent agent in the NFL.26 He represented a series of firstround draft picks and quarterbacks.27
He sold his sports agency to a Canadian company, Assante, in
a fairly complicated transaction.28 But in selling the sports agency,
there was a basic question of what you can sell if the union can
basically decide at any given time who can or cannot represent the
players.29 If you are an agent and you sell for $100 million or $50
million your right to represent the players, but at the same time the
union has regulations in place that say the players can change their
mind at any time as to who is going to represent them, then there
are obviously limits as to what you can buy and sell.30
22

See supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text.
Jeffrey L. Kessler is a partner at Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP. See WGM Directory,
Weil, Gotshal & Manges, at http://www.weil.com/weil/pd_frames.html (last visited Mar.
25, 2003).
24
See Steinberg Sues Former Associate, L.A. BUS. J., June 4, 2001, at 29.
25
E.g., id.
26
See Richard Weiner, Steinberg Sells Agency for $120 Million; Other Groups May
Follow, USA TODAY, Oct. 28, 1999, at 7C (describing Steinberg as “one of the NFL’s
most powerful agents”).
27
See E. Scott Reckard, Steinberg to Sell Firm for $120 Million, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 28,
1999, at C1; Weiner, supra note 26, NFLPA, Agent Profile: Steinberg, Leigh, at
http://www.nflpa.org/agents/agentProfile.asp?ID=07396 (last visited Mar. 16, 2003)
(listing Steinberg as having negotiated fifteen active contracts).
28
See Reckard, supra note 27; Weiner, supra note 26.
29
See Ron Borges, No Vick up Their Sleeve, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 27, 2001, at C7;
supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text.
30
Attorneys acting as agents are automatically employed at-will, subject to dismissal at
the client’s discretion. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16, cmt. 4 (2001) (“A
client has a right to discharge a lawyer at any time, with or without cause, subject to
23
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What is going on in this federal litigation right now is that
David Dunn, who was a senior person within the Steinberg firm
and who was principally involved with client relations over the
years, decided he was going to leave. He left and took all sorts of
clients with him.31
Leigh Steinberg’s firm, Steinberg, Moorad, and Dunn [SMD],
went to court to try to seek an injunction under state law to
basically force, directly or indirectly, the clients to come back to
Mr. Steinberg.32 We are saying that cannot be done because, as a
matter of federal labor law, state law cannot determine who is
going to represent this player or that player.33 So, our position is
that it is absolutely clear under labor law that the union decides.34
But because of this, all sorts of issues as to who represents whom
also arise.35
When you talk about the agents, they generally do not
represent only a single player.36 If the NFLPA wanted to, it could
say every agent could only represent one player, which would not
make sense for anyone. You want people who have broad
negotiating experience, so you have agents representing a number
of players.
And you have it in a sport where there is a salary cap, where, at
least within certain rules, there are limits as to how much money

liability for payment for the lawyer’s services.”); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(b)(4) (2001). In addition, NFLPA policy guarantees that all
player representatives are subject to discharge at-will. See Borges, supra note 29.
31
See Jonathan E. Kaplan, Show Me the Subpoena!, AM. LAW., June, 2002 (stating that
Dunn left the firm in early 2001, taking sixty-eight clients with him).
32
See Steinberg Sues Former Associate, supra note 24, at 29.
33
See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2000); Collins v. Nat’l Basketball Players Ass’n, No. 92CV-1022, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 24069 (10th Cir. Sept. 21, 1992).
34
See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a); Collins, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 24069, at *1. The NFLPA’s
motion to deny Steinberg, Moorad, and Dunn’s [SMD] requested injunctive relief was
granted, after a jury trial that awarded SMD more than $40 million in damages against
Mr. Dunn and his co-defendants. See Brenda Samdburg, Brobeck Team Scores $2.7 Mil.
in Attorney Fees, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 12, 2003, at 4.
35
See Kaplan, supra note 31; Steinberg Sues Former Associate, supra note 24, at 29.
36
See, e.g., NFLPA, supra note 27 (listing Steinberg as having fifteen active contracts
negotiated).
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you can pay certain players, although teams can go over the cap in
various circumstances.37
But if you have an agent who is representing two players and
the team only has a certain amount of money left under the salary
cap and the agent is trying to negotiate contracts simultaneously
with those two players, what does the agent do? There may be $2
million under the cap that needs to be split between two players
and that agent represents both players.38
So in terms of a basic question—is there a conflict or isn’t
there a conflict? That is certainly something to talk about.39 But
the way the system is constructed, the NFLPA has said that so long
as those possible situations are disclosed and known to everyone, if
players can change their representation when they want, then that
is fine.40
There are certain limits as to what unions can or cannot do. In
terms of conflicts in what agents do, I will just mention one thing
that is in the news.

37

See NFL-NFLPA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. XXIV, supra note 19.
See Robert E. Fraley & F. Russell Harwell, The Sports Lawyer’s Duty to Avoid
Differing Interests: A Practical Guide to Responsible Representation, 11 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 165, 185 (1989) (“[A] conflict could arise if a lawyer represents
multiple clients who seek remuneration from a limited fund. For example, a lawyer may
represent two NBA players on the same team, where the aggregate salaries of each team
in that league must not surpass a ‘salary cap.’”). See, e.g., Len Pasquarelli, Adams Still
Searching for a New Home, ESPN, at http://espn.go.com/nfl/columns/pasquarelli_
len/1400183.html (June 28, 2002) (noting that agents Eugene Parker and Roosevelt
Barnes together represent both linebackers Ray Lewis and Peter Boulware in contract
renegotiations with the Baltimore Ravens).
39
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) (2001) (“A lawyer shall not represent a
client if the representation of that client will be directly adverse to another client,
unless . . . each client consents after consultation.”); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-16, DR 5-105(a)–(c) (2001).
40
In this respect, NFLPA policies require basic compliance with the rules of legal
ethics, which bind attorneys, for all player representatives, whether or not they are
members of the bar. Hence, agents must disclose any potential conflicts of interest
arising out of their representation of multiple clients. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 1.7; MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-16, DR 5-105(a)–(c) In addition,
agents may only serve clients as at-will employees, subject to discharge at their clients’
discretion. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16, cmt. 4 (“A client has a right to
discharge a lawyer at any time, with or without cause, subject to liability for payment for
the lawyer’s services.”); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(b)(4).
38
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U.S. News & World Report recently had a cover story about
frauds that had been committed on NFL players over the years by
their financial advisors.41 In this case, the NFLPA, as the union, is
very much concerned about these sorts of issues.42 In one case,
there was an agent, Tank Black, who engaged in various frauds on
players43 where he was representing them in the negotiations with
the teams but at the same time was giving them advice on their
finances and investing their money.44
The NFLPA has just implemented a financial advisors program
so that financial advisors can be registered by the NFLPA as to
whether they have complied with various regulations under the
program.45
But I want to note that there are certain limits as to what unions
can or cannot do.
The NFLPA is the union, but in terms of what an employee is
going to do with his money after he gets it from his employer, that
is not generally a term or condition of employment.46
And so this program that the NFLPA is undertaking, which is
very important, is not mandatory. It is something in which
advisors can participate if they choose, but the players will know
the agent’s choice one way or the other.47
In terms of how this sort of program deals with potential
conflicts, the basic principle is generally one of disclosure. If you
41

30.

See Edward T. Pound, Money Players, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 11, 2002, at

42
See generally id. (showing that the NFLPA is very concerned with financial advisors
defrauding players).
43
See id.; Agent Tank Black Gets Five-Year Sentence for Swindling Players, SPORTING
NEWS, May 7, 2002, http://www.sportingnews.com/nfl/articles/20020507/401934.html.
44
See Pound, supra note 41.
45
See Michelle Singletary, Giving the Boot to Bad Financial Advice, WASH. POST,
May 2, 2002, at E3 (explaining that in 2002, the NFLPA initiated a “Financial Advisors
Program” to establish a code of conduct and check the backgrounds and credentials of
those proffering services to protect NFL players from financial fraud); NFLPA, Financial
Advisors, at http://www.nflpa.org/financial/main.asp (last visited Jan. 18, 2003).
46
See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2000) (noting that employee representatives are empowered
by the NLRA to bargain with employers concerning only “rates of pay, wages, hours, or
other conditions of employment”).
47
See id.; supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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have a situation with a financial advisor recommending
investments, it is difficult. You can not just suggest an investment
in a company in which you have an interest.48 I think this is the
case across-the-board. Many solutions for conflicts require that the
person on the other end is fully advised of the conflict and is an
adult in a position to have the information to make the decision.49
DEAN FEERICK: Thank you very much, Dave. That is very
helpful.
Craig?
MR. FENECH: The business of representation, obviously, is
much broader than that. It involves people in individual sports. In
fact, a good part of the last month or so of my time has been taken
up with two Canadian figure skaters.50 If you had said that to me a
year ago, I would have laughed at you, but that is the way it has
been.
“Conflicts of interest,” it is almost like a magic phrase. People
say “conflict of interest” and everybody gasps, they shrink in
horror—“this is terrible.”
I think that there are real and apparent conflicts of interest and
there is a big difference between the two. There are conflicts
which are acceptable and waivable by your clients and then there
are others that are not.51 Let me give you some examples of what I
am talking about, real-life examples.
48

It is a conflict of interest for an attorney-agent proffering financial advice to
encourage a client to invest in an entity in which the attorney has an interest without
disclosing that fact. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101(a) (2001)
(“Except with the consent of his client after full disclosure, a lawyer shall not accept
employment if the exercise of his professional judgment on behalf of his client will be or
reasonably may be affected by his own financial, business, property, or personal
interests.”). See also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a) (2001); MODEL CODE
OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-1 (2001). The NFLPA program for Financial Advisors
imposes similar requirements. See Financial Advisors, supra note 45.
49
See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
50
See generally Man Accused in Figure Skating Fix Attempt to Be Extradited to U.S.,
CNN, at http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/08/01/figure.skating.fix (Aug. 1, 2002)
(describing the scandal at the 2002 Olympics in Salt Lake City in which judges allegedly
conspired to deprive Canadian skaters Jamie Sale and David Pelletier of gold medals).
51
If an attorney does not have a “reasonable belief that the representation” of one client
“will not adversely affect the relationship with the other client” or “be materially limited
by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client,” or if it is not “obvious that he can
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I represented two radio disc jockeys in another part of the
country. I represented both of them in the first negotiation, and I
talked to them about whether their interests were congruent with
one another, and determined that they were.52 The fact that their
contract expired the day before I met with them probably had
something to do with their view in that particular case. So, I did
the contract, and it was about three years long. I represented them
over the course of the three years, during which time they would
proceed to carp about one another to me and made my life kind of
miserable.
It developed that one of them felt that he should be paid more
money than the other. To me that is an irreconcilable conflict
unless the other fellow says, “Yes, I agree,” and you will wait a
long time to hear those words.53
In that particular instance, I considered that to be an
irreconcilable conflict. Therefore, either the clients had to choose
what they wanted to do, or I had to choose whom I wanted to
represent.
As it turned out, it was sort of a mutual thing. The guy who
did not want to earn as much money wanted to get a local lawyer,
and he did so, and I wound up representing the guy who wanted to
earn more money, and indeed he wound up earning more money.
So that, to me, is a conflict. All conflicts must be disclosed,
but that is one that could not be reconciled, and therefore one of
them had to go.54
Now, often it will happen that you represent two people who
are seeking the same position. Let me give you an example.

adequately represent the interest of each,” a conflict is unacceptable and cannot be
waived. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)–(b); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(c). See also MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-16.
52
After full disclosure, clients may consent to dual representation, provided that the
conflict of interests is waivable. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7; MODEL CODE
OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-16, DR 5-105(c).
53
Hence, the conflict will probably not be waivable. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.7; MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-16, DR 5-105(c).
54
If an unacceptable conflict arises after the commencement of representation, the
lawyer should withdraw from the representation. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
1.7, cmt. 2.
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Years ago, I represented three pitchers on the same Major
League team. One pitcher I had represented for years, the other
one I had picked up as a client a couple of years earlier by referral,
and he referred me to a third guy who was in the minors who
wound up making the club.
Well, the middle guy called me. His career had not gone as
well as the other two. The truth is, he was not as good a pitcher.
He called me one day and he said, “Craig, you know, I think you
have done a great job for me, I really like you, and I am going to
fire you.”
I said, “Well, why?”
He said, “I think you have a conflict of interest.”
I said, “I don’t think that is really the case.” I would have had
a conflict of interest if I could have made the determination, or
even had a substantial influence on the determination, as to who
made the club.55 But, first of all, the club was keeping ten pitchers,
not three; and secondly, no general manager has ever asked me,
“Gee, Craig, which of your clients should I keep with the ball
club?” In point of fact, they do not want to hear from me on that
subject.
So the conflict in that case, in my opinion, was more apparent
than real.56 I said this to him at the time, “Look, let’s be honest.
You know why I am being fired. You guys called me and said,
‘We want to buy a house in Seattle. Do you think that is a wise
thing to do?’ and I said, ‘No, because I think that you are on the
bubble as to whether or not you make the club. I’m picking up
rumors that you may in fact be traded, and there is a work stoppage
55

If an attorney-agent could determine that one of her clients would succeed at the
expense of another client, she could not possibly hold a “reasonable belief that the
representation” of one client would “not adversely affect the relationship with the other
client” or “be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to [the other] client.” In
addition, it would not be “obvious that [s]he [could] adequately represent the interest of
each,” and the conflict would not be waivable by either client. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)–(b); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(c). See also
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-16.
56
It is important to remember that even when an attorney-agent is comfortable with
multiple representation, he should advise his clients of “any circumstances which might
cause [them] to question his undivided loyalty.” MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY
EC 5-19.
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looming in the next twelve months, so for all those reasons I don’t
think it’s a good thing to put all your assets into a house and
encumber yourself with a heavy mortgage.’”
That was not what his spouse wanted to hear. That was the
wrong answer as far as she was concerned, and that is why I was
being fired. Okay, you live with that, and he did fire me, and I
guess he used the conflict of interest argument.
He said to me, “I’ve talked to other agents who say that no
reputable agent would represent more than one player on a given
team.”
I said, “That is nonsense. First of all, you can’t control it.
What are you going to say to me tomorrow if in fact you are
traded?” By the way, about a month later, he was traded to a team
where I do not have any players.
A lot of the time people employ arguments like conflict of
interest when really what they are saying is, “My career isn’t going
as well as I think it should.” So that to me is an example of an
apparent conflict of interest rather than a real one.
However, the client retains the right to view it differently.57 It
is his career, and if that is what he wants to do, then that is what he
has to do, whatever the reason. He does not even have to give you
a reason. You are employable at will.58
I remember one agent who called me one day and he said,
“What kind of deal is that? The guy can fire you at any time.”
I said, “I think that it behooves you then to make sure that you
are always on the same page as your client and that he is aware of
what your efforts are and that he has some appreciation for those
efforts. But you are right. If job security is what you are looking
for, this is the wrong business.”
So there are those kinds of conflicts of interest.
57
Id. (“Regardless of the belief of a lawyer that he may properly represent multiple
clients, he must defer to a client who holds the contrary belief and withdraw from
representation of that client.”).
58
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16, cmt. 4 (“A client has a right to discharge
a lawyer at any time, with or without cause, subject to liability for payment for the
lawyer’s services.”); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(b)(4).
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Now I will give you another example. At one point, I
represented three collegiate basketball coaches in the United
States. I do not know how many Division I programs there are, but
I had coaches at three of them.
Two of them decided that they wanted the same job that
opened up. I was thinking to myself, “What do I have to do, have
one client in each sport in order to avoid a conflict?” That was a
tricky one.
The New York Post was talking daily, speculating as to whether
this guy or that guy was ahead or who the candidates were, and
they did that very effectively. They named about twelve
candidates, and at one point, named each one of them as the front
runner, so that no matter who got the job, they would be able to
announce that they had correctly predicted a month earlier that he
was the front runner. It is an interesting journalistic technique.
The way it works is that athletic directors do not even want to
hear from agents. They think that agents are vermin, and I think the
agent who directly calls an athletic director and says, “Hey, Joe
Jones is my client and he really wants the job,” has pretty much
stuck a dagger in the heart of Joe Jones’ chances. But it is true that
you can have some influence on the process from the outside,
depending on your relationship with the media, your relationship
with alumni or other coaches. So, I told them, “I will do whatever
you want on this. I will stay out altogether or either one of you can
fire me, hopefully not both.”
Anyway, the bottom line was they both asked that I give my
honest evaluation of each of their chances. Really, in that case you
function more as sort of a counselor.
The guy will say, “I have a friend who has a friend who dated
the president of the university. Do you think I should reach out to
them?” You say, “No, I think that would be a bad idea” or a good
idea, whatever. That is what you do.
In that case, neither of them fired me. One of them indeed got
the job. The other one fell out rather quickly. I found out
afterwards when I was negotiating the contract for the guy who got
the job that the other guy did not have a chance, because in fact the
university had considered suing him some years earlier, before I
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was representing him. Although there were certain media people
promoting his candidacy, he never had a shot.
So that to me is an example of where there is a potential
conflict. You have a duty to fully disclose to your clients what the
conflict is and what your role will be, but they are free to resolve
that in whatever fashion they deem appropriate.
The final thing I will talk about is when I was representing two
broadcasters who wanted the same position. This comes up all the
time. But what never comes up is what happened next—I guess it
does not “never” come up, it just rarely comes up.
The executive producer sat there and said to me, “So, Craig,
which one of these guys should I hire?” Now, both of them
currently worked for this organization, so he knew everything there
was to know about them.
I looked at him and I said, “I’ll tell you what. I’ll answer that
question if you tell me that my answer is dispositive of the issue,
because I think you are yanking my chain just to watch me wiggle,
and I am not about to give you an answer to that question. You
know both guys, you know what you want from this particular
position, and you are not about to cede the authority to make that
decision to me. But if you are, I will answer the question.”
I was bluffing, because had he asked me to, I couldn’t have
answered that question. That would have been to me an
irreconcilable conflict. I would have had to step out and say to
both my clients, “either you have to get somebody else, or you can
keep me, but I can’t continue to represent both of you in this
regard.”
However, I was pretty sure that he was bluffing, and indeed he
was. He laughed and he said, “So you won’t even admit you have
a conflict?”
So he just laughed and moved on. In that case, neither of them
got the job. So that is an example of a conflict that was real, but
turned out to be illusory, in that neither guy got the job.
But it depends on what your role is in securing the job. People
misapprehend what the role of an agent is. I mean, you watch
these movies on television and you think the agent walks in and
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says, “I demand that my guy get hired for this.” It is just nonsense.
Jerry Maguire59 was an amusing movie, but, frankly, it bore the
same relationship to reality that most movies do, a distant one.60
By the way, I am one of the few agents who did not claim to be
the prototype for Jerry Maguire, and I did not think he was a better
person at the end of the movie than he was at the beginning of the
movie. It seemed to me that his big concern for the wide receiver
was when the guy got hurt, and that was his only meal ticket. How
does that differ from when he started?
DEAN FEERICK: Thank you for that very interesting
presentation.
Charles Grantham?
MR. GRANTHAM: Thanks to David and Craig for providing
an outline of what potential conflicts exist. I will share a few
things and give you a historical perspective about why we created
agent regulations in the first place.
We initiated the agent regulatory program back in the early
1980s, quite frankly, as a result of players complaints about the
excessive fees charged for the representation of players.61 At that
time, they were being charged from ten to twenty percent for
contract negotiations.62 And, from a selfish perspective, players
were asking, “What can you do about these enormous fees?”
That got me thinking as to how we, as an exclusive bargaining
unit, could regulate player agents. That was back in the early
1980s.63

59

JERRY MAGUIRE (Tristar 1996) (feature film about a premier sports agent who opens
his own business after he is dismissed from his firm).
60
Cf. Reckard, supra note 27 (claiming that Leigh Steinberg “was the model for the
agent portrayed in Jerry Maguire”).
61
See Sam Goldaper, Plan to Certify Agents and Limit Fees, N.Y. TIMES, May 13,
1986, at B9 (discussing the NBPA’s agent regulation program, initiated in 1986, which
requires that agents wishing to negotiate contracts with NBA teams be certified by the
union and agree to fee limitations).
62
See generally id. (noting that the 1986 NBPA agent regulation program limits agent
fees to an annual maximum of four percent).
63
See Danny Robbins & Manny Topol, Certification Denied for Agent, NEWSDAY
(N.Y.), May 30, 1988, at 74.
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Also, in the early 1980s came the introduction of revenue
sharing and salary caps in professional sports.64 We were the first
to engage in such an arrangement with management.65 However, if
I had to do it again, I would say that we would not agree to a
revenue-sharing arrangement which included hard salary caps.66
This first agreement had exceptions that allowed teams to exceed
the agreed upon cap. This first agreement had exceptions that
allowed teams to exceed the agreed upon cap.
So there are two perspectives, one from just being the advocate
of players’ rights and two, those potential conflicts which would
arise from the agreement.67
But the reality of it is very simple, and that is that any of you in
this room could be an agent tomorrow if you had a son or a brother
or a cousin who was seven-feet, three-inches, who averaged fortyfive points a game in college, and had a very adept left-handed
hook shot. You could be his agent and probably none of the
unions would prevent that from happening.68
I mean, we can talk about the regulatory process: the test, the
application, but the reality is you need a client. If you can get
yourself a client: a football player, a baseball player, or a
basketball player, then I guarantee you that you can become an
agent very quickly.
I guess the other area of interest to me, is one that represents a
conflict with the NCAA.69 Of course, all of us on this panel could
complain about the potential conflicts that they face.
64
See Cerisse Anderson, Players Seek End to NBA Salary Cap, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22,
1987, § 3, at 12 (noting that the NBA negotiated a revenue-sharing agreement with its
players in 1983, guaranteeing them fifty-three percent of the league’s revenues under the
CBA and noting that salary caps imposing minimum and maximum team revenues were
instituted in the 1984–85 season to promote competitive parity).
65
See id.
66
See generally Steve Ashburner, Wanna Beat Magic? Put ‘Em on the Line; O’Neal
Clangs Iron the Loudest, STAR TRIB. (Minn.), Apr. 23, 1995, at C6 (explaining that
“hard” salary caps differ from “soft” caps in that soft caps allow teams to spend over the
cap in order to re-sign free agents, while hard caps strictly limit a team’s spending).
67
See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
68
But see unions’ various regulations of agents, supra note 6 and accompanying text.
69
See Greg Garber & Lyn Bixby, Should We Pay College Players? Camby Case Puts
Focus on Agents’ Giving of Gifts, HARTFORD COURANT (Conn.), June 23, 1996, at A1.
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I wrote an article some ten years ago regarding giving some
college players a share of the economic pie.70 What was present
then is clearly present today, which is that the television networks
have someone representing their interests, the athletic directors
have someone representing their interests, the college coaches have
someone representing their interests, and the players have no one.71
As we watch “March Madness” today—a multibillion-dollar
contract for CBS to present the games in March—we begin to
wonder again: the issue of education,72 is it a priority or is it a
distraction? At this point, it is clear that in March, academics
become a distraction.73 I have a keen interest in seeing that college
athletes are represented, and represented fairly.
The whole conflict of interest question and understanding the
issues relating to conflicts of interest, in most cases, is too
sophisticated for some of your potential clients to totally
understand.74
Prior to 1980, for example, before there were regulations, the
NBA was like the “Wild West.” You had agents representing the
coach, the general manager, and the player, and you had players
say, “I want that agent because he represents the coach, the general
manager and another player on the team,” not understanding that

70

Charles Grantham, It’s Time to Give Players a Cut, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1990, § 8,
at 10.
71
See Garber & Bixby, supra note 69 (discussing the problem of “improper
inducements by agents” and questioning whether agent representation of college athletes
should be permitted).
72
See generally Barry Temkin, Duncan Asks Why Colleges Don’t Educate, CHI. TRIB.,
Mar. 31, 2002, at 18 (addressing the issue of poor academic performance by college
athletes). See Peter Alfano, The Tug of War Between Athletics and Academics, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 27, 1983, § 5, at 1 (discussing the conflict between academic eligibility and
success, and the pressures of athletic performance and success faced by student-athletes).
73
See Tom McMillen, March Madness Really About Frenzy for Money, USA TODAY,
Apr. 1, 2002, at 13A (discussing the influence of money on college sports in light of the
$6 billion contract signed between CBS and the NCAA for television rights to eleven
years of basketball coverage, the deleterious effect of money on the education of studentathletes, and the inability of the NCAA to effectively reform this system).
74
Where clients are unable to fully comprehend the nature of potential conflicts,
disclosure requirements cannot serve their intended purpose. See MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2001); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-16, DR 5105(c) (2001).
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down the road that conflict could be damaging to their potential
careers.
So in many cases, it really will rely on how well you
communicate with your client so that he understands what a
conflict of interest is—whether it is perceived, whether it is real.75
These issues are practical, the ones that you have to confront with
your client.
DEAN FEERICK: Thank you very much. It is very helpful.
Steve Krane?
MR. KRANE: I think it is accurate to say that player agents
frequently run into real or perceived conflicts that have to be dealt
with in one way or another. Sometimes agents try to deal with
these conflicts by saying, “I am not functioning as a lawyer for this
particular player or for any of my clients. I am functioning just as
their agent. You do not have to be a lawyer to be an agent. I am
doing something that any non-lawyer could do if they pass the test
or go through the registration process or whatever.”
But an important thing to remember if you are a lawyer is that
you are subject to the ethical rules of the legal profession whether
you are functioning as a lawyer or not, or whether you think you
are functioning as a lawyer or not, and you will be held to those
standards. So do not think you can avoid the conflict of interest
rules when representing players with conflicting interests just by
saying, “I am not providing legal services to them at this particular
moment, or at all.”76
We have had a number of instances over the years of agents
who got raked over the coals in the press, the back pages of the
tabloids, for representing what were perceived to be conflicting

75

See generally MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-19 (“Regardless of the
belief of a lawyer that [s]he may properly represent multiple clients,” she must disclose
even the potential perception of a conflict of interest and “defer to a client who holds the
contrary belief” as to whether representation should continue.).
76
Once admitted to the bar, attorneys must comply with ethical standards in all
dealings, whether or not they are of a specifically legal nature. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 8.4(a); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(a)(1). See also
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-5.
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interests. And sometimes a perception is reality and they are
indeed doing things that perhaps they should not do.
Money drives the sports world like it drives everything else. It
drives agents, and it is very hard to say, as a lawyer, as an agent, as
any kind of professional, to a potential client, “I cannot take you
on; go somewhere else.” Nobody likes to say those words ever,
because you are losing out on whatever up-side potential may exist
for representing them.77
But sometimes you have to say that. Sometimes, as you have
heard from the panelists so far, conflicts are irreconcilable. That
comes out of the concept in the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct that governs lawyers in most places in the country, or the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which governs lawyers in
New York, that sometimes even the informed consent of a client is
not sufficient to allow you to take on a representation in the face of
a conflict of interest. There will be some conflicts that are so
extreme that, no matter what you tell a client and no matter what
they say, you should not take on that representation. So bear that
in mind.
This is not something that is just a sports issue. This is
something that all lawyers face in various contexts, particularly
when, in the sports context, you have team sports where there are
salary caps in place, so any negotiation that you have for multiple
players on a team is, in effect, a zero-sum game—somebody wins,
somebody loses; somebody is going to get more, and if that
somebody gets more, another somebody gets less.78
That happens a lot in the commercial setting too, where, for
example, you have an insolvent defendant in a litigation and you
are representing two claimants against a single finite insurance
policy. There is only so much money there that is available to pay
these two claimants. How can you represent both of them? Can
77

See Goldaper, supra note 61 and parenthetical accompanying note 62 (explaining
that an agent can earn up to four percent commission on each player contract negotiation
under NBPA rules).
78
See Fraley & Harwell, supra note 38, at 185 (“[A] conflict could arise if a lawyer
represents multiple clients who seek remuneration from a limited fund. For example, a
lawyer may represent two NBA players on the same team, where the aggregate salaries of
each team in that league must not surpass a ‘salary cap.’”).
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you really effectively represent both, even if they both agree upfront to the simultaneous representation?79 That is a difficult
question that gets talked about quite a bit in ethics circles.
The adequacy of disclosure is something else to keep in mind.
Are you really telling the clients everything they need to know,
even in the context of a waivable conflict, for them to make an
informed decision, a reasoned decision, as to whether you are the
best person to represent them or whether they should go
somewhere else?
It is a hard thing to do, to sit down with a client and tell them:
this is the conflict, this is what could happen down the line, these
are the implications of your waiving the conflict and agreeing to be
represented by me because of these other interests that I have.80
Sometimes you may not be in a position even to make that
disclosure because it would require you to reveal confidential
information that relates to another client. And if you cannot make
that kind of disclosure, if there is something secret going on for
one of these other clients that you have a conflicting interest with,
you are not going to make to be able to make the effective
disclosure that you need to even ask for a waiver.81
So these are all concerns that come up in every aspect of legal
practice whenever you represent more than one client. Someone
once asked me, “How do you avoid conflicts of interest?” I said,
“Never have a client,” because as soon as you have one client,
there is the potential for a conflict between your business interests,

79

See, e.g., Pasquarelli, supra note 38 (noting that agents Eugene Parker and Roosevelt
Barnes together represented both linebackers Ray Lewis and Peter Boulware in contract
negotiations with the Baltimore Ravens).
80
Such a discussion would constitute full disclosure as required by the rules of legal
ethics. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2001); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-16, DR 5-105(c) (2001).
81
Attorney-client confidentiality requires that each client consent to all details of his
representation before disclosure. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a). If one
client refuses to consent to the disclosure of information which another client would need
to make an informed decision as to whether to waive a potential conflict of interest, the
attorney may not attempt to seek a waiver in absence of full disclosure, and must instead
decline or withdraw from representation. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7,
cmt. 5.
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your personal interests and their interests.82 When you have two
clients, you might as well hang it up. You are never going to avoid
conflicts of interest.
The way to deal with that is to detect them quickly, talk to the
client, and sometimes make the judgment that this is not something
that you should be doing.
Now, this is not something that is peculiar to representation of
individual athletes or entertainment personalities. My practice has
been almost exclusively representing sports leagues. As you
probably know, the major sports leagues are either joint ventures
or unincorporated associations,83 or in the case of Major League
Soccer a single corporate entity—although we are still waiting for
the First Circuit to tell us a little bit more information about that.84
But, by and large, the leagues are associations of individual
businesses that agree to come together in a joint venture or an
unincorporated association to play a sport and have a schedule and
officials and so on.
If you represent these leagues, you always end up representing
the league entity and the individual franchises in the league. When
the league gets sued, the complaint names the NBA and a list of all

82
See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101(a) (“Except with the consent
of his client after full disclosure, a lawyer shall not accept employment if the exercise of
his professional judgment on behalf of his client will be or reasonably may be affected by
his own financial, business, property, or personal interests.”). See also generally MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-1.
83
A joint venture consists of “an association of persons or companies jointly
undertaking some commercial enterprise.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 839 (6th ed. 1990).
An unincorporated association is a “voluntary group of persons, without a charter, formed
by mutual consent for purpose of promoting common enterprise.” Id. at 1531.
84
In 1997, eight professional soccer players sued MLS, investor/owners who controlled
some of the teams, and the United States Soccer Federation [USSF] for antitrust
violations under the Sherman and Clayton Acts. See Wagman, supra note 5 (describing
the dispute between MLS and professional soccer players in the league over whether each
team should have to negotiate as a separate entity with players for services or whether the
league should be permitted to continue operating all of the teams as single entity). In
March 2002, the First Circuit decided that the existence of MLS as a single entity was not
unlawful. See Fraser v. Major League Soccer, 284 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2002), cert. denied,
123 S. Ct. 118 (2002).
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of the franchise owners in the league, and you appear for all of
them.85
What then happens when a dispute arises between a team and a
league, like a franchise relocation situation,86 or a dispute over
local TV rights like the Chicago Bulls litigation that went on for
six and a half years in the early 1990s?87 What do you do when
the team then says, “Hey, you cannot be adverse to me, you
represent me. You represent me in six other ongoing litigations,
plus you advise me constantly by sitting with the Board of
Governors and talking to us on legal issues?” How do you deal
with that issue?
Fortunately, most of the time it does not get raised, and if it
does not get raised, you sort of blink at it and go on. But it is an
issue that has arisen.
It is dealt with in some leagues by the adoption of by-laws that
involve an advance waiver by the individual teams that they will
not object to the league being represented by a law firm that
represents the league and the teams in other matters when and if it
happens that they have a dispute with the league. So you get the
advance consent to a conflict of interest.88 That has held up so far.
It has not been challenged, so it has held up very nicely. But it

85

See, e.g., Bridgeman v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 838 F. Supp. 172 (D. N.J. 1993)
(listing the NBA and all the franchise owners as defendants).
86
For example, six NFL teams relocated between 1982 and 1995, including the
Raiders, twice. See, e.g., City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 176 Cal. Rptr. 646 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1981), vacated, 646 P.2d 835 (Cal. 1982); Chris Harry, NFL Owners in a
League of Their Own, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., Mar. 17, 2002, at C1. See also Alan
Abramson, Raiders, NFL Keep Arguing Before Case Goes to the Jury, L.A. TIMES, Apr.
28, 2001, at D2 (discussing the Oakland Raiders’ suit against the NFL in which the team
argued that the league’s failure to finance a new stadium forced it to relocate back to
Oakland).
87
See Chi. Prof’l Sports v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996) (hearing
a suit by the Chicago Bulls and a cable television station against the NBA for antitrust
violations due to the broadcast restrictions and fees that the league sought to impose).
88
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2001); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-16, DR 5-105(c) (2001).
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remains to be seen what will happen if somebody argues about
that, because advance waivers are a controversial issue.89
I would just like to briefly talk about one other conflict, the one
time in my practice when conflicts of interest and sports law came
together in a very prominent way and in a very unusual way.
It involved the president of the United States Olympic
Committee (USOC) in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Robert
Helmick.90 Bob Helmick was a lawyer. He was a lawyer with a
municipal bond practice in Des Moines, Iowa,91 and he was a
sports volunteer par excellence and did a tremendous amount of
good for the USOC and devoted a tremendous amount of time to
the Olympic movement and moving it forward in the United
States.92
Unfortunately, this did not do particularly good things for his
legal practice. His partners became very annoyed with him that he
was spending so much time on Olympic matters and not enough on
municipal bonds in Des Moines.93 He was put on the so-called
“eat what you kill” approach to partner compensation, which is
essentially—we will call you a partner, but you are compensated
based solely on what you generate yourself.94 This put a
tremendous amount of financial pressure on him to try to generate
some business for himself so that he would have some income.
So he did what he knew best. He went to some clients, or
potential clients, who were doing business with the Olympic
Committee, or who wanted to do business with the Olympic
Committee, or other entities within the Olympic movement and
had them put him on retainer as a consultant and took hundreds of
thousands of dollars from them over the course of a number of
89

See Jonathan J. Lerner, Honoring Choice by Consenting Adults: Prospective Conflict
Waivers As a Mature Solution to Ethical Gamesmanship, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 971
(2001) (discussing of the controversy surrounding the use of advance waivers).
90
See Phil Hersh, USOC Boss Won’t Quit over Conflict Charges, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 6,
1991, at 3C.
91
Id.
92
See id. (listing other sports associations on which Helmick served).
93
See Mike Dodd & Rachel Schuster, Helmick Says Clients Were OK; Critics
Disagree, USA TODAY, Sept. 5, 1991, at 2C.
94
See id.
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years, $50,000 which would be good for X number of hours of
services,95 and the services were generally “I’d like to meet Soand-So; could you arrange the introduction?”96
This came out in the press. I am not telling you anything that
is confidential.97 This was widely reported in 1991.98 I was the
chief investigator for the Olympic Committee that delved deeply
into this situation and reported and made recommendations to the
committee.99
Ultimately, Mr. Helmick was forced to resign from his
position, not just as president of the Olympic Committee, but as a
member of the International Olympic Committee (IOC).100 At that
time, even Nazi war criminals had not been forced to resign from
the IOC.101 Of course, times have changed.102 He was really a
pioneer in that regard of leaving the IOC.103
But that was one area where sports law and legal ethics came
right together, clashing on the front pages of the newspapers.
Conflicts are everywhere. You are lawyers or are going to be
lawyers, and you will be dealing with conflicts, no matter what
kind of practice you are in, everyday of your careers. The key, and
I advise you if you are still in law school to listen closely in your
ethics class, is that ninety percent of dealing with ethical issues is
issue spotting and knowing enough to ask a question; knowing
enough to see a problem approaching. You do not have to know
the answers. If you do not know the answers, call me and pay me
my fee and I will give you the answers.
95

See id.
See Business Deals Draw Attention, USA TODAY, Sept. 6, 1991, at 8C (describing
the nature of Hemlick’s relationships with various companies and individuals).
97
See Mike Dodd & Rachel Schuster, Helmick Report Has New Change, USA TODAY,
Nov. 22, 1991, at 2C (crediting USA Today with breaking the story).
98
See id.
99
See Ken Stephens, USOC Probe Leaves Schiller with an Improved Attitude, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Dec. 22, 1991, at 18B.
100
See id.
101
See John Powers, Chaos Reigns with Soviets After Latest Developments; Many
Uncertainties Must Be Hammered Out, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 15, 1991, at 54 (stating that
Helmick was the first member of the International Olympic Committee [IOC] to “resign
under fire” in fifty-five years).
102
See id.
103
See id.
96
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At this point, I will turn it back to the Dean to open up for
questions.
DEAN FEERICK: Thank you very much. We will have a
comment from the members of the panel.
David?
MR. FEHER: I just wanted to note one thing, because it is
interesting. Steve had mentioned that whenever in the bankruptcy
context you have people going against a finite pool, there is
conflict and how that would be analogized to the agent context.
I do not know how far this goes for sure, but it is a little bit
different in the union context, in the sense that those sorts of moral
questions arise all the time with unions, where in a collective
bargaining negotiation they may be told by the employer: “You
have $1 million and you can spend that on your own employees
however you want. If you want it to go to this plant, that plant or
another plant, that is your choice. We do not really care, but that is
all that we are going to spend.” Then those union bargainers have
to make that tough decision as to who gets the money.
Now, agent compensation is driven by how much player salary
they individually help to create, and they are not on salary from the
union, so it is slightly different.104 But at the same time, they are
exercising authority delegated by the union in a similar context,
which can happen where clubs or even leagues will say, “You get
this money and you can do whatever you want with it,” and then
the delegated agent of the union or the union itself has to decide.105
The union faces tough decisions all the time as to where money
goes between veterans or rookies, or this particular type of player
or that particular type of player. Those are inherent in the structure
of the labor laws because the union is the exclusive bargaining
representative of everyone.106
104

See, e.g., Kenneth Abo & Jack P. Sahl, A Professional Responsibility and Primer for
Today’s Entertainment Lawyer, 18 ENT. & SPORTS L. 3, 7 (2000) (noting that sports
agents are usually compensated by their clients on a contingency fee); Goldaper, supra
note 61 (explaining that an agent can earn up to 4 percent commission on each player
contract negotiation under NBPA rules).
105
See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2000); Fraley & Harwell, supra note 38.
106
29 U.S.C. § 159(a).
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DEAN FEERICK: Thank you very much.
Let me ask the other two panelists if there is anything more
they wanted to say, now that everyone has spoken?
MR. FENECH: First of all, the situation where an agent can
represent the coach, the general manager and the players on the
same team, exists today in the NFL.107 It does not in the NBA108
and it is sort of a gray area in Major League Baseball.109 It used to
not exist, and now there has been some blurring of that.110
The second is what Dave just talked about, and Charlie can
speak to this better than anyone, that situation exists every time
there is a collective bargaining negotiation, because not all of your
membership is situated the same way and you have to trade off the
interests of one group to get something for another.111
The clearest example I can think of right off the top of my head
was there was a collective bargaining situation in baseball where
the union gave back the right to go to salary arbitration, which is
one of the paramount rights that a player can earn in baseball,112
and moved it back from two years to three years, thereby dropping
the hammer on a whole class of players, one of whom happened to
be Tom Henke, who I was representing at the time, who would
otherwise have been eligible for salary arbitration,113 and it cost
Henke and many of the players in that group hundreds of
107

NFLPA agent regulations do not expressly prohibit such representations, but they do
prohibit engaging in activity “which creates an actual or potential conflict of interest or
the appearance of conflict of interest with the effective representation of NFL players.”
NFLPA, supra note 6.
108
See Richard Justice & Mark Asher, Falk’s Role in Jordan Deal Is a ‘Concern’;
Agent Rules Under Review, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 2001, at D1 (noting that the NBPA
prohibits an agent from representing both a player and being a team executive).
109
See, e.g., Thomas Hill, Valentine’s “Double Agent”, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), July 24,
1997, at 67 (indicating that then-MLB rules prohibiting player agents from representing
management without permission of the players union).
110
See id.
111
See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a).
112
See generally Murray Chass, Lacking Suitors, Bonds Remains with the Giants, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 20, 2001, at S1 (discussing the probable benefit to Bonds of his decision to
exercise his right to salary arbitration).
113
Salary arbitration eligibility was increased from two to three years under the MLBMLBPA CBA agreed to on August 7, 1985. Baseball Labor Stoppages, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
31, 2002, § 4, at 6.
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thousands, even millions of dollars, and I do not remember
anybody asking for any waiver of conflict of interest in that regard.
DEAN FEERICK: Mr. Grantham?
MR. GRANTHAM: I would add one thing. Keep an eye on
the baseball negotiations, because from my perspective, they will
probably not agree to a revenue sharing or salary cap.114 I think if
you look at all the sports, the hard caps become real problems for
unions and for individual athletes.115
I think the interesting thing to watch with regard to baseball is
that the kind of revenue sharing that they are negotiating is revenue
sharing among teams.116 As long as the union can keep
management focused on revenue sharing among themselves, then
the union will prevail and not have a salary cap or revenue sharing
with the players.117
Revenue sharing as a technique is clearly, very simply put, a
management technique, because they control access to the numbers
and the process. They control access to the information and all the
financial operations.118 In spite of what anyone will tell you on the
union side,119 the union will not get access to every single entity
and the revenue generated by them.120 And if, in fact, you do not
have a staff, from a forensic standpoint, to monitor management’s

114

Steven Greenhouse, This Time, a Tie Breaks the Deadlock, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31,
2002, at D1.
115
See Anderson, supra note 64 (discussing the frustration of NBA players with the
hard salary cap in that league).
116
Greenhouse, supra note 114. Cf. Anderson, supra note 64 (explaining that the
NBPA consented to a hard salary cap in exchange for NBA owners agreeing to 53
percent revenue sharing with the players).
117
See Greenhouse, supra note 114. Cf. Anderson, supra note 64.
118
See, e.g., Dale Hofmann, Selig’s Biggest Battles Are Ahead, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Sept. 1, 2002, at 1C.
119
See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Coolly, Fehr Plays His Hand, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22,
2002, at D1. According to Donald Fehr, head of the MLBPA, the union generally does
not oppose revenue sharing, but opposes it only when coupled with a luxury tax, since the
combination of the two effectively acts as a salary cap. Id.
120
See, e.g., Hofmann, supra note 118 (criticizing the CBA reached between the
MLBPA and baseball management on August 30, 2002, for failing to require that shared
revenue be spent on the players and ensure that the additional revenue will be used to
improve the teams).
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conduct you will not get full disclosure and full information from
them.121
As a result, the hard salary cap jeopardizes all these individual
athletes.122
QUESTIONER: One of the things that has always bothered me
is the salary cap that you have in professional football and
basketball. Of course, it is much worse, it seems, in football
because you have so many players on one team that have to be let
go because of the salary cap.123 In baseball, they have their
problems too, where you have somebody like Steinbrenner who
can pay all kinds of money and there is nobody else who can
compete with that.124 But it seems that the salary cap, certainly in
professional football, is not the answer, where a team might win
the Super Bowl and in the next year they have to let go half of their
players.125
MR. FEHER: By the way, as counsel for the players, I want to
say that I wholeheartedly agree that the salary cap is not an answer
for anything.
I do want to say that in the NFL, the only reason the salary cap
is there is because it is the result of a settlement after a trial where
we won a verdict but there were threats of an appeal and the legal
proceedings could have gone on, so it was not agreed to with a
high degree of enthusiasm.126
The other thing that I want to mention is that in terms of
players getting cut, I cannot give you a percentage on this, but I
wholeheartedly believe that the salary cap is in some ways the

121

See id.
See Anderson, supra note 64; Hoffman, supra note 118.
123
See John Clayton, Salary Cap Decisions Affect League Parity, ESPN, at
http://espn.go.com/nfl/columns/clayton_john/1260343.html (Oct. 6, 2001); Aaron
Rennie, Salary-Cap Ravaged Ravens Practically Starting Over, CBS, at
http://cbs.sportsline.com/nfl/story/5645600 (Aug. 27, 2002).
124
Clayton, supra note 123.
125
See id.; Rennie, supra note 123.
126
See Clark C. Griffith, New Law Provides Optimism in the Coming Baseball Labor
Negotiation, ANTITRUST MAG., Spring 2002, http://www.ccgpa.com/atart12.htm.
122
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world’s greatest excuse for any team.127 And I have talked to
coaches about this, in terms of grievances as to why guys are cut.
At a grievance hearing where a coach just told a player that he
was one of the greatest players in the world, and then he cut him,
the question was—was the player released because of the cap or
was it because he was not such a good player?
The coach said, “What do want me to do? Do you want me to
go to the player and say, ‘I think you’re on the down-side of your
career, we really don’t want you anymore,’ or do you want me to
say, ‘We cut you because of the cap?’”128
In that instance, and I think in a lot of other instances, the cap
is an impersonal and ready excuse for a lot of teams who are going
to cut guys anyway,129 and where they do not want to be seen by
either the teammates or in the papers as making a negative
comment on a player.130 The player is going to go out and try to
get a job with another team, and in many instances he does go out
and get a job with another team at a pretty good salary.131
And so I would just say that when you see these things, take it
with a little bit of a grain of salt because there is some measure of
courtesy involved and excuses, which are understandable. But it is
easier to blame a cap than it is to blame a player or a team.
MR. GRANTHAM: If I can add for a moment, from the
beginning, both the employer and employees must have a joint
philosophy as to the league operation.132 On management’s part,
you have X number of teams. On the labor side, you have uniquely
talented individuals to fill these teams’ rosters.133 Each of these is
127

See NFLPA, IT HAPPENS EVERY FEBRUARY: MEDIA MISPERCEPTIONS OF THE
CURRENT NFL SYSTEM (2002) (“Bottom line: The cap has become a most convenient
strawman.”), http://www.nflpa.org/PDFs/Shared/Media_ Misperceptions.pdf.
128
See id.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
See id.
132
See, e.g., William J. Hoffman, Comment, Dallas’ Head Cowboy Emerges Victorious
in a Licensing Showdown With the NFL: National Football League Properties v. Dallas
Cowboys Football Club et al., 7 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 255, 260–64 (1997) (describing
the NFL’s philosophy of cooperation among its teams).
133
See Phila. World Hockey Club v. Phila. Hockey Club, 351 F. Supp. 462, 501–02
(E.D. Pa. 1972) (stating that NHL owners paid high salaries to players as a result of the
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a uniquely talented individual, and therefore a cap restricts and
prohibits them from realizing their real worth in the
marketplace.134
Secondly, the difference between basketball and football, is
that most contracts signed in football are not guaranteed,135 and as
a result, they have a hard cap and simply can replace or waive
players in order to get under the cap for the following year.136
You do not see that in basketball because they are guaranteed
contracts,137 and once they have signed the player, they must pay
him, and will not likely waiver him unless a settlement is reached
or a guaranteed portion of his salary.138
So it goes back to the league’s philosophy. For example, the
NFL has decided that they would like to have a new Super Bowl
winner every year or, it’s the competitive balance argument.139
They simply would rather for these teams to compete on a level
playing field.140 Gone are the days in football of dynasties.141 The
NFL hard salary cap promotes parody.
Perhaps basketball will follow suit.142 However, the problem
in the NBA is the current structure denies teams the ability to

players’ skill, and holding that professional hockey players are not “interchangeable
products” for antitrust purposes); Emily C. Chi, Star Quality and Job Security: The Role
of the Performers’ Unions in Controlling Access to the Acting Profession, 18 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 72–74 (2000) (outlining the differences between union members in
construction work and unions in the entertainment industry).
134
See Stephen F. Ross, Antitrust Options to Redress Anticompetitive Restraints and
Monopolistic Practices by Professional Sports Leagues, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 133,
152–54 (2001) (examining labor market restraints in professional sports leagues).
135
See Randy Cross, Thoughts from a Dry Week of Owners Meetings, SPORTING NEWS,
Mar. 20, 2002, http://www.sportingnews.com/voices/randy_cross/20020320.html;
NFLPA, A New Look at Guaranteed Contracts in the NFL, at http://www.nflpa.org/
PDFs/Shared/Guaranteed_Contracts.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2003).
136
See, e.g., Tim Tucker, No Guarantees in the NFL, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 3, 2002.
137
See id.
138
See id.
139
See Justin Brown, Pro Football’s Triumph of Equal Opportunity, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Jan. 3, 2003, at 3.
140
See id.
141
See id.
142
See, e.g., John Donovan, In Search of a Dynasty, CNN/SI, at http://sportsillustrated.
cnn.com/inside_game/john_donovan/news/2000/08/04/dynasty (Aug. 4, 2000).
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improve.143 For example, the New York Knicks are stuck for the
next five years.144
Now, if you were the Commissioner of the NBA, you ask
yourself, “The major markets—New York, Chicago, Boston,
L.A.—I would like for them to be competitive every year.”145
Therefore, the structure a revenue-sharing agreement, would
enable all teams New York, Chicago, Boston, et cetera, or George
Steinbrenner, for example, the right to pay what he wants to get a
good team.146 So it starts with the league’s philosophy and vision
with regard to revenue sharing.
It ends in the collective bargaining agreement that you have
negotiated with the players.147
MR. FENECH: I just want to say one other thing. Everybody
links revenue sharing with salary cap.148 There is no reason why it
has to be.149 There is nothing to prohibit the owners in baseball,
for example, from sharing the revenue in pretty much whatever

143

See Jonathan C. Latimer, The NBA Salary Cap: Controlling Labor Costs Through
Collective Bargaining, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 205 (1994).
144
See Joe Aquilar, New York Knicks 2001–02 Season Preview, SPORTS NETWORK, Oct.
25, 2001.
145
See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposal for the Antitrust Regulation of Professional
Sports, 79 B.U. L. REV. 889, 906 (1999) (stating that New York is the largest market in
the U.S., with over 14 million people); Top 50 Cities in the U.S. by Population and Rank,
1990 and 2000, Info Please, at http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0763098.html (last
visited Mar. 16, 2003) (listing the top five cities in the U.S., in terms of population, as
New York, Los Angeles, Houston, Chicago, and Philadelphia, with Boston ranked at
twentieth).
146
See, e.g., Walter Adams & James W. Brock, Monopoly, Monopsony, and Vertical
Collusion: Antitrust Policy and Professional Sports, 42 ANTITRUST BULL. 721 (1997)
(stating that owners traditionally approve of competition between teams where it works in
their financial favor and so long as they “receive their ‘fair’ share” of profits).
147
See NFL-NFLPA CBA art. XXII, supra note 19; Peter N. Katz, Comment, A History
of Free Agency in the United States and Great Britain: Who’s Leading the Charge?, 15
COMP. LAB. L.J. 371, 381–84, 394–96 (1994).
148
See, e.g., Brien C. Bell, Baseball’s Economic Woes, BUS. TODAY, Winter/Spring
2002, at 12–13 (stating that revenue sharing without a salary cap is inflationary and
ineffective),
http://www.businesstoday.org/mag/2002spr/nation-baseball.pdf;
Allen
Barra, Bud Selig’s Forked Tongue, Salon, at http://archive.salon.com/news/sports/col/
barra/2001/12/14/selig/index1.html (Dec. 14, 2001).
149
See Piraino, supra note 145, at 937–38 (arguing that there are “less restrictive
alternatives” available to ensure competitive balance).

2 - PANEL II FORMAT

438

4/15/03 9:32 AM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 13: 405

fashion they choose.150 And it really has nothing to do with the
players. The players do not control that. If the owners really
wanted to share revenue, they could.151
They do not, however. The George Steinbrenners, the largemarket teams, do not want to share revenue, so the game in
baseball, and I have spent twenty-two years watching this
negotiation game in baseball, is the so-called large-market
owners.152 And it is really not the size of the market, it is the size
of the revenue that the team generates, and that may have to do
with the expertise of the people running the franchise.153 The
large-revenue teams have interests that are antithetical to the smallrevenue teams, but they both choose to fight the players and try to
paper over their grievances with one another.154 That is what
happens in every single baseball negotiation.
MR. FEHER: By the way, in terms of this parity issue, the
salary cap does not really make a whole lot of sense in terms of
promoting parity, if that is your only goal.155 The salary cap has a
big effect on the owners’ bottom line in terms of why we thought
the owners were looking for it.156 That is the only basis we ever
believed.

150

See RICHARD C. LEVIN ET AL., THE REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT MEMBERS OF THE
COMMISSIONER’S BLUE RIBBON PANEL ON BASEBALL’S ECONOMICS (2000) (detailing the
panel’s various recommendations for revenue sharing in baseball), http://www.mlb.com/
mlb/downloads/blue_ribbon.pdf.
151
See, e.g., Stephen F. Ross, Light, Less-Filling, It’s Blue-Ribbon, 23 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1675, 1680 (2002) (stating that “any changes in revenue sharing will require the
voluntary agreement of the owners or an extraordinary edict by the Commissioner under
his newly granted powers”) (emphasis added).
152
See Marc Topkin & Bill Adair, Amid MLB Woes, Rays Numbers Are Optimistic, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), Dec. 7, 2001, at 1C.
153
See Eric Fisher, NFL Moving Toward Division of the Haves and Have-Nots, WASH.
TIMES, Sept. 9, 2001, at C3.
154
See, e.g., Christopher Carey, Cards Post $7.3 Million Loss, Report Says; DeWitt
Says He’s Worried About Baseball’s Finances, ST. LOUIS DISPATCH, Dec. 7, 2001, at D1.
155
See Ross, supra note 151, at 1697–99 (explaining why a blanket salary cap would be
ineffective in creating parity among MLB franchises).
156
See Christopher D. Cameron & Michael J. Echevarria, The Ploys of Summer:
Antitrust, Industrial Distrust, and the Case Against a Salary Cap for Major League
Baseball, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 827 (1995) (arguing that a salary cap in baseball would
have little effect on competitive balance).
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There are other very ready solutions to parity, one of which is
actually in the NFL’s collective bargaining agreement, but that
only applies in uncapped years. Basically if a team wins the Super
Bowl or is one of the final playoff teams, they cannot sign as many
free agent players the next year.157
So you can have very limited rules promoting parity that do not
have an effect on the total wage bill.158 But the thing that the
owners really want is to have rules that limit the total wage bill,
which is usually what collective bargaining agreements are about,
or what antitrust cases are about, in terms of employers trying to
inhibit competition so that their total wage bill is lower.
For example, there is a very common practice in the NFL,
which does not get talked about very much, of signing a long-term
contract with a big roster bonus that kicks in in a certain year,
where both the player and the team know that when that year
comes the player is not going to make it.159 The contract has a $6
million roster bonus or something like that. It says it is a six-year
contract, for signing bonus pro ration reasons. Because in the
NFL, and I know this sounds complex, but the bonus is a form of
guaranteed money.160 The players get their money upfront.161 So
they get a big signing bonus, there is a six-year contract, but
because it has a huge roster bonus that is payable at the beginning
of the fourth year everyone knows the player is going to get cut at
the beginning of the fourth year.162 So he gets his big paycheck
upfront and it is really a three-year contract for all practical

157

See NFL-NFLPA CBA art. XXI, supra note 19; Adam W. Heller, Creating a WinWin Situation Through Collective Bargaining: The NFL Salary Cap, 7 SPORTS L.J. 375
(2000) (outlining the basic provisions of the NFL-NFLPA CBA).
158
See David Thomas, Let’s Wear a Patriots Cap, EVENING STANDARD (London), Sept.
10, 2002, at 81.
159
See David J. Sipusic, Instant Replay: Upon Further Review, the National Football
League’s Misguided Approach to the Signing Bonus Should Be Overturned, 8 SPORTS
LAW. J. 207, 221, 239 n.233 (2001).
160
Id. at 218–19. See also Ed Bouchette, Pittsburgh’s Heinz Field Helps NFL Team
Stand Up to the Competition, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 24, 2001.
161
See Bouchette, supra note 160.
162
See Gary G. Roberts, Interpreting the NFL Player Contract, 3 MARQ. SPORTS L.J.
29, 33 (1992).
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purposes.163 It is just a totally different structure that happens to be
negotiated that way.
In the NBA, the situation is different because you have
guaranteed contracts.164 Some of this results from the fact that the
sports are different in terms of the type of sports they are—the
number of players, the length of careers, and from where the sports
were coming.165
From the players’ point of view, we do not think the current
system is perfect by any means, and I am more than willing to take
any idea you have that will not involve the continuation of the cap.
MR. KRANE: Here we have the polarization of the sports law
field coming full-tilt at you. I have spent the last twenty years
defending the legality and reasonableness of salary caps in various
leagues.166 It is not exactly on our topic of conflicts of interest,
and it is also a subject that we could debate for the next three days
without finishing.
But I will just say that, in defense of the leagues that do have
caps, there is one fundamental question that you have to ask: If you
are a professional athlete, are you going to take a “me first, I want
as much money as I can get” attitude, or do you have a concern
about there being a league at all ten years down the road?167

163

See Scott McPhee, Comment, First Down, Goal to Go: Enforcing the NFL’s Salary
Cap Using the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT.
L.J. 449, 468–72 (1997) (describing how NFL teams use signing bonuses even with
salary cap restrictions).
164
See Robert P. Garbarino, So You Want to Be a Sports Lawyer, or Is It a Player
Agent, Player Representative, Sports Agent, Contract Advisor, Family Advisor or
Contract Representative?, 1 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.F. 11, 37 (1994); Roberts, supra note
162, at 32.
165
See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 162, at 30–31; Sipusic, supra note 159, at 218–19.
166
See, e.g., Fraser v. Major League Soccer, 284 F.3d 47 (1st Cir.) (holding that the
teams comprising MLS do not violate antitrust laws in functioning as a single entity when
negotiating employment contracts with players, thereby preventing players from
negotiating contracts with individual teams and facilitating a hard salary cap), aff’d, 123
S. Ct. 118 (2002); Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995);
Bridgeman v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 838 F. Supp. 172 (D.N.J. 1993).
167
See, e.g., Roger Adams, Baseball: Safe at Home, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Aug. 29,
2002 (discussing recent tension in negotiations between baseball owners and players,
during which the owners have expressed financial desperation).
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MR. GRANTHAM: If I could make one point, and I do not
represent a legal view, but strictly a business view. It is very
simple economics: If I own a team and I must revenue share,
would I rather share with the players?168 If I share with the
players, I will now have acquired a partner, and all partners then
have financial certainty.169 As soon as you engage in this type of
revenue sharing you have agreed to a cap on wages.170
If you read The New York Times this past Sunday, Len
Koppett, who is notably one of the best writers in sports, wrote a
very interesting piece.171 It simply said that the owners in baseball
are being unpatriotic, and they are being unpatriotic because they
are not sharing this “thing” with us, this “thing” that somehow
escapes all of us.172 Maybe Enron could have had that thing.
Well, what is that thing? That thing is the ability to have a
business or be in a business for 148 years, like some of the baseball
teams, or for the last three decades, and lose money, most recently
$500 million, but still not go out of business, and at the same time
increase your revenue by three-fold. What is that secret?
Whatever it is, if you are not sharing it, you are not being patriotic
to our people.173 I rest my case.
QUESTIONER: Is the structure of bargaining units and player
representation and leagues and clubs similar or different in the
minor leagues for those sports that have minor leagues, and are
there conflicts between the parent club and the minor league club?
168

See Dan Lewis, Look for the Union Label, National Review Online, at
http://nationalreview.com/nrof_comment/comment-lewis080202.asp (Aug. 2, 2002)
(discussing how revenue sharing among teams decreases the amount which teams can
spend on players, thereby reducing salaries and creating a “cap”); Darren Rovell,
Steinbrenner to File Antitrust Suit?, ESPN, at http://espn.go.com/mlb/s/2000/
0719/641139.html (July 21, 2000).
169
See Lewis, supra note 168; Rovell, supra note 168.
170
See Hal Bodley, Fehr Blasts Owner’s Proposals: Memo to Players, USA TODAY,
Aug. 20, 2002, at 1C (discussing how a plan to adopt revenue sharing is a wholesale
attack on salary structure and would result in big losses for big spenders, such as the New
York Yankees); Lewis, supra note 168; Rovell, supra note 168.
171
See Leonard Koppett, Backtalk: The Business of America’s National Pastime Is
Unpatriotic Obfuscation, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2002, § 8, at 9.
172
See id.
173
See id.; Darren Rovell, Economists: Baseball’s Debts Misleading, ESPN, at
http://espn.go.com.mlb/s/2000/0719/641339.html (July 21, 2002).
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MR. FENECH: Let me answer that for baseball. First of all,
there is no bargaining unit for minor league baseball players.174
They are the abandoned stepchildren of the sport. That is point
one.
Secondly, the minor league clubs have a contractual
relationship with the major league clubs.175 A few years back, the
major league clubs saw that the minor league clubs were actually
running a pretty profitable business, and they hammered them in
the negotiation of their contract with the minor league clubs, so
they now exist at the sufferance of the major league clubs.176
You know, having an unregulated monopoly is a wonderful
thing.177 My favorite line from John Helyar’s book, which I would
recommend to all of you, called Lords of the Realm, was, and I
cannot quote it exactly, Ted Turner is quoted as sitting in an
owners’ meeting saying, “Guys, we have the only unregulated
monopoly in America and you are still”—I’ll say screwing it up.178
It is true. It is absolutely true.
So to answer your question, minor league players get the short
end of the stick. Minor league players earn $850 a month in their
first contract year.179 One of the guys in my office showed me his
father’s contract as a minor league baseball player, which would
have been back in like 1960, and he earned $650 a month. So that
shows you how their wages have increased.
QUESTIONER: I have two quick questions. You said that if a
lawyer is representing, and even acting as an agent, that they are
174

See Michael Kinsman, Ballplayers Union Proves So Successful, SAN DIEGO UNION
TRIB., Aug. 18, 2000, at H-2.
175
See Lori Clark, The Evolution of Minor League Baseball, Western Michigan
Whitecaps
Captivations,
at
http://www.whitecaps-baseball.com/PRESSBOX/
FEATURE98/minors.html (July 3, 1998).
176
See Clark, supra note 175; Bob Hoie, Minor League Farm Systems, En El Punto, at
http://www.enel.net/beisbol/history/leagues/minors/farm.html (last visited Mar. 20,
2003).
177
See Major League Baseball v. Butterworth, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1316 (N.D. Fla. 2001)
(noting that the business of baseball has been exempt from the antitrust laws since 1922);
WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES & POLICY 258–64 (7th
ed. 1997); JOHN HELYAR, LORDS OF THE REALM: THE REAL HISTORY OF BASEBALL (1994).
178
See HELYAR, supra note 177.
179
See Hearing on S. 53 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (1997) (statement of
Dan Peltier), available at http://www.diamondfans.com/minors-peltier.html.
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still held to the lawyer’s standards of ethics.180 What happens if
there also is a lawyer involved on behalf of the player? Does the
standard change for that agent who also happens to be a lawyer?
MR. KRANE: No. If you are a lawyer, you are subject to the
Code of Professional Responsibility or the Model Rules in all of
your dealings with clients, and sometimes in your personal life.181
Even when you are acting for yourself individually, there are some
rules that apply to you as an individual. So there is no escaping it.
You sign on as a lawyer, you take the baggage.182
QUESTIONER: My other question was for Craig. I wondered
if you could discuss any interesting merchandising conflicts of
interest, as opposed to just conflicts arising in salary negotiations?
For example, what if two players are looking to get on a cereal
box?
MR. FENECH: Okay. Once again, though, the problem is that
“Wheaties” usually makes that determination. I would love to
make it for them and you would see my clients on the Wheaties
box right now.
But I think that the point that was raised earlier, that there is the
real world and then there is the world that we live in in law school.
These conflicts come up and we sort of dance around and hope
they do not arise. But actually, we have an ethical obligation to
see that they do arise, do we not, to see that they are spoken about
and that people are made aware of them?183

180

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(a) (2001); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(a)(1) (2001). See also MODEL CODE OF PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-5 (2001).
181
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(a); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(a)(1). See also MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 15.
182
See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl., § 4 (“A lawyer’s conduct should
conform to the requirements of the law, both in professional service to clients and in the
lawyer’s business and personal affairs.”).
183
Clients may only consent to dual representation after full disclosure where a potential
conflict of interest exists if an attorney has a “reasonable belief that the representation” of
one client “will not adversely affect the relationship with the other client” or “be
materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client,” and it is “obvious
that he can adequately represent the interest of each.” Otherwise, a conflict is
unacceptable and cannot be waived, even through full disclosure and consent. MODEL
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I think the concept of advance waivers flies right in the face of
all that we have talked about here. To me it is ludicrous to say, “I
am going to represent the whole league and I am going to represent
the individual teams. You do not know what it is, but you are
waiving it.” It is absurd and it is a fiction.
MR. KRANE: When you are dealing with sophisticated
business-people, as we are with sports owners, who also have their
own lawyers, they are at least beyond the age of consent and they
know what they are doing.
MR. FENECH: That is a long way from sophisticated.
MR. KRANE: They know what they are doing. They know
what they are getting into. It is different when you are dealing
perhaps with individuals or with kids in college who are signing on
with their first agent. Maybe there it is something to think about.
Ethics opinions on advance waivers make a distinction between
the sophisticated business-person and the individual who may
never have had an experience with a lawyer and has no advisors.184
So you have to look carefully at each situation to see if it is
really workable.
QUESTIONER: One of the things that was interesting back in
the 1980s, I will not name the Players Association person I spoke
with, but when I first started seeing players being victimized by
people who were giving financial advice, that lost them all their
money, I asked if the Players Association could do something.
They said, “We tried and then too many agents threatened to sue
us.” So they dropped the whole thing.
What I find interesting is they spent all this time trying to
ensure that players get the most amount of money possible on

RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)–(b); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5105(c). See also MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-16.
184
See, e.g., New York County Lawyers’ Comm’n on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 724 (1998)
(stating that a lawyer can seek an advance waiver with respect to future conflicts, and that
the validity of the waiver will depend on the adequacy of disclosure given to the client
under the circumstances, taking into account the sophistication and capacity of the person
or entity giving the consent).
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contracts, and then seem to be doing nothing until very recently to
make sure that they try to retain that money.185
With unions traditionally, you have pension funds that they
invest their members’ monies in, and they have served as financial
advisors, at least in that sense.186
So I do not understand why you would think that giving some
type of financial guidelines is not appropriate for a Players
Association and why they would not want to start certifying, or at
least giving strong guidelines for, investment counseling.
MR. FEHER: On that, there are different buckets of money, so
to speak. If it is money within the collective bargaining agreement
that is in the pension plan, that is subject to all the normal federal
rules governing that.187 Those are monies received that are subject
to the collective bargaining agreement.188
What I was talking about is a little bit different, which is that,
for example, if you are an auto worker, apart from your pension
you also get say $1,000 in a given week as part of your paycheck.
Then your union says, “You’re not allowed to go down to Charles
Schwab because we have decided we are not going to certify
Charles Schwab for this reason or that reason.” That is money that
the employees have gotten as salary which the employees as adults
feel that they should decide as to how they are going to invest it
personally.

185

See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
See Employee Retirement Income Security Act [ERISA], 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461
(2000).
187
See id.
188
See DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT LAW GUIDE: LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE SERVICES, http://www.dol.gov/asp/programs/guide.htm (n.d.).
[ERISA] requires persons and entities that manage and control plan funds to:
manage plans for the exclusive benefit of participants and beneficiaries; carry
out their duties in a prudent manner and refrain from conflict-of-interest
transactions expressly prohibited by law; comply with limitations on certain
plans’ investments in employer securities and properties; fund benefits in
accordance with the law and plan rules; report and disclose information on the
operations and financial condition of plans to the government and participants;
and provide documents required in the conduct of investigations to ensure
compliance with the law.
Id.
186
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The other thing is that unions are democracies, and whatever
unions decide to do is, in general, driven by what the players
themselves want. And so quite often there are comments like,
“Why doesn’t the union just do this because it is for the good of
the players?”
In the union leadership there are certainly very experienced
people who know what is going on, and the leaders of the union
have tended to be there over a number of years.189
It is very, very difficult for a union to say, “Even though my
members do not want this, I am going to force it on you in terms of
what is going to happen with your personal paycheck.”
This has been important enough of an issue for the NFLPA to
implement this financial advisors program.190
But, the program is voluntary.191 If one of the players does not
want to deal with one of the registered financial advisors, he could
take his money to his brother-in-law who is not registered, who
says he should invest in some apartments or some options or
whatever. That is money that is in his pocket. It is different.
Even though this is a country that allows unions, this is still a
country that does not allow unions, as far as I know, to tell
employees what they can do or not do with their money once it
gets in the employees’ pockets.
QUESTIONER: My question involves the situation going on in
baseball right now with the league actually owning a team.192
Whose role is it now to police transactions with the Montreal

189

See, e.g., Gene Upshaw, Info Please, at http://infoplease.com/ipsa/A0109717.html
(last visited Mar. 20, 2003) (noting that Gene Upshaw, a former player with the Oakland
Raiders, has been Executive Director of the NFLPA since 1987).
190
Singletary, supra note 45 (explaining that in 2002, the NFLPA initiated a “Financial
Advisors Program” to establish a code of conduct and check the backgrounds and
credentials of those proffering services to protect NFL players from financial fraud).
191
See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2000) (Employee representatives are empowered by the
NLRA to bargain with employers concerning “rates of pay, wages, hours, or other
conditions of employment,” but they are not empowered to instruct employees as to what
to do with the wages that they receive.).
192
Meg Vaillancourt, Sale of Marlins Clears Way for Close of Red Sox Sale, BOSTON
GLOBE, Feb. 19, 2002, at D1 (noting that in February 2002, MLB purchased the
financially troubled Montreal Expos from owner Jeffrey Loria for $120 million).
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Expos, because that role is traditionally empowered to the
Commissioner?193
MR. FENECH: It is the Commissioner. He has assumed that
authority himself.194 He also owns the Brewers, although perhaps
not technically.195 But their answer to that is it is in a blind trust.196
I gather he cannot remember that he owns the Brewers. I mean, it
is laughable—talk about conflict of interest.
QUESTIONER: In terms of what we have seen in the industry
lately, the trend towards consolidation, other than building the
screening wall,197 as SFX198 has done, what else can be done to
avoid the conflict of interest? And does creating a screening wall,
destroy some of the synergies that you were potentially looking to
achieve through consolidation?
MR. FENECH: The screening wall is a joke, as many
screening walls in fact are.199 It is a fiction. It is like the blind
trust that Bud Selig has with the Milwaukee Brewers.200
193

See Jack O’Connell, Following His Lead; Selig Has Skippered Sport Through
Changes, Strike, HARTFORD COURANT (Conn.), Mar. 31, 2002, at L2.
194
See Gordon Edes, Caught Up in Spring; Here’s an Early Fan’s Guide to Everything
Under the Sun, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 15, 2002, at E1.
195
Bud Selig, Commissioner of MLB since 1998, has owned an interest in the
Milwaukee Brewers since the 1970s. When he became the interim Commissioner in
1992, he created a blind trust run by his daughter, Wendy Selig-Prieb, to oversee the
Brewers. Nonetheless, Selig retains a financial interest in the club, an arrangement that
has prompted conflict of interest criticism. See Tom Haudricourt, Conflict of Interest?
Owners Want It That Way, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINENTAL, Jan. 13, 2002, at 13C; Ross
Newhan, Budding Leader; Bud Selig, Who Used to Say He Didn’t Want to Be
Commissioner, Is Expected to Be Near Unanimous Choice Today Because He’s a Known
Quantity, L.A. TIMES, July 7, 1998, at C1; Ross Newhan, Selig Gets Commissioner’s
Power, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1992, at C1.
196
See Haudricourt, supra note 195.
197
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 573 (7th ed. 1999) (A screening wall, also referred to as
an ethical wall is “a screening mechanism that protects client confidences by preventing
one or more lawyers within an organization from participating in any matter involving
that client.”).
198
Clear Channel Communications, About SFX, SFX, at http://sfx.com/publish_
static.asp?page=AboutSFX (last visited Mar. 25, 2003) (explaining that SFX, a
subsidiary of Clear Channel Communications, is an agency representing professional
athletes in baseball, basketball, football, hockey, tennis, and golf, and owning or
operating approximately 130 live entertainment venues throughout the world).
199
Id. See also David Greising, Chinese Wall No Great Defense Against Conflicts, CHI.
TRIB., May 22, 2002, at B1.
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But the answer to your question is if there really was this
separation, yes, it would destroy the synergies, although it seems to
me that they have had a lot of problems in defining exactly what
those synergies really are. I mean, it is a nice word, but nobody
knows what it means in practice.
DEAN FEERICK: Steve, I have a question to you. There are a
lot of law students here. Would you add any additional comments
on screening walls?
MR. KRANE: “Screens” are very controversial, highly
controversial.201
The American Bar Association (ABA) House of Delegates at
its meeting two meetings ago, just within the last year, debated
whether screens should be allowed in certain limited circumstances
within law firms to wall off lawyers who at other firms had
previously represented clients and now had come to a new firm
that is going to be adverse to someone that they represented.202
You screen them off so that they do not impart any confidential
information that they learned from the old client.203 Is that good
enough, without going to the former client and asking for a waiver,
which is the standard?204
That was hotly debated, and it went down to defeat, as it did in
the New York State Bar Association House of Delegates when I
was the proponent of it several years ago.205 So the legal
profession is not too keen on having screens, even in large law
firms, even to cure problems.206 Today screens are used primarily
200

See Haudricourt, supra note 195.
See Susan R. Martyn, Conflict About Conflicts: The Controversy Surrounding
Screens, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 53 (1993).
202
See Memorandum from Tom Edmonds, to the National Association of Bar
Executives [NABE] (Aug. 10, 2001), http://www.abanet.org/nabe/deleg07.html.
203
Greising, supra note 199.
204
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2001); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105 (2001); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-16, 519 (2001).
205
N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N SPECIAL COMM’N ON THE L. GOVERNING FIRM STRUCTURE
AND ORG., PRESERVING THE CORE VALUES OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION: THE
PLACE OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE IN THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (2000),
http://www.nysba.info/whatsnew/maccrate.pdf.
206
See Martyn, supra note 201, at 53.
201
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as an adjunct to consent, as a way of convincing a client that it is
okay to waive a conflict because we will implement these
procedures to make sure that your confidential information is
preserved and that it does not leak over to the lawyers who are
representing the other side. So it is just a way of getting consent,
not a substitute for consent.207
MR. FEHER: And just as a follow-on to what you are saying, I
think that with consolidation there are important things that can be
bought. You just have to be careful as to what you are buying, in
the sense that if you buy somebody, buy an agency that represents
a large number of players, if it is a stable agency that has a lot of
goodwill with those players that is going to persist over time and
you have confidence in them as businessmen, it is worth your
money.
If it is a situation where you do not know whether tomorrow
those players are going to be somewhere else, you should be a little
more careful as to what you are going to do with your money,
because, as I said earlier in terms of what the underlying rules are,
they allow for a lot more freedom of choice on the part of the
players.208
And so I am not saying do not buy them and that it’s not
important and you cannot get synergies with your marketing
efforts, because you can, but you just need to be sure that you
invest in solid entities. And I think that applies across the board.
MR. FENECH: Well, I think that these discussions are helpful,
and I think that guidelines are very important. I usually see my
role in these as being the guy who is sort of on the ground and, to
quote Howard Cosell, tries to “tell it like it is.”209
All of these considerations are very important, and the closer
you can come to adhering to them perfectly the better off you are.

207

See id.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16, cmt. 4 (“A client has a right to
discharge a lawyer at any time, with or without cause, subject to liability for payment for
the lawyer’s services.”); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(b)(4).
209
See COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 691 (6th ed. 2001) (noting that this was Howard
Cosell’s mantra and an apt characterization of his approach to journalism).
208
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I think everybody in the profession wants to see people playing
by the rules. The problem is the reality out there is far different
than that, and I would caution you when you get out there, some
people get a little carried away and think that it is the “Wild West,”
and you can wind up getting burned, particularly if you are not
somebody who has a lot of clout in the industry, which typically
you won’t be in the beginning. So be careful and adhere to these
rules as best you can, but know that your competition probably is
not.210
MR. GRANTHAM: Just as a follow-up to answer the question
with regard to unions and the advisory capacity with financial
management, I would only say to you that unions are political
units. You may want something for the players, but it is what they
want for themselves that ultimately rules at the end of the day.
You may provide education as a union, however, with regard to
financial advice, in particular, you must rely on trained
professionals. The labor law is very specific about what the union
can do regarding the management of individual players’ money.211
Negotiating their contracts and items in collective bargaining
agreements is the union’s regulatory responsibility. With regard to
financial management, the union can only act in an advisory
capacity. 212
So it becomes political more so than anything at that point.
DEAN FEERICK: Thank you.
Steve?
MR. KRANE: Well, I will just echo everything that everyone
has said, except the denigrating comments on the salary cap and so
on. But really, just a reminder, in case you forget, that as lawyers,
210

See Paul Ruschmann, Are Sports Agents Facing a Regulatory Blitz?, 65 MICH. BAR
J. 1124 (1986), available at http://www.paulruschmann.com/clips/sports_law/sports_
blitz.htm.
211
See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2000) (Employee representatives are empowered by the
NLRA to bargain with employers concerning “rates of pay, wages, hours, or other
conditions of employment,” but they are not empowered to instruct employees as to what
to do with the wages that they receive.).
212
See, e.g., Singletary, supra note 45 (explaining that in 2002, the NFLPA initiated a
“Financial Advisors Program” to establish a code of conduct and check the backgrounds
and credentials of those proffering services to protect NFL players from financial fraud).
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your reputation is all you have, and it is very fragile. The financial
pressures in the competitive business environment we are in to get
clients and to keep clients, are tremendous and sometimes push
you pretty close to the line. They will push you. If you have not
been pushed already, you will be pushed.
Just when you reach the point that you think you are about to
cross over the line, step back and think: Do I really want to risk
everything I have worked for my entire career and throw it all
away for a little bit of money or even a lot of money? I think the
answer should be no.
I would just urge you to take the high road whenever you can
and you will not be sorry.
DEAN FEERICK: I am sure you will agree with me that was a
great panel.
Thank you very much.

